Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2018

The Changing Nature of Death Qualification and its Interaction
with Attitude Salience
Brendan Busch
Claremont McKenna College

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses
Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Busch, Brendan, "The Changing Nature of Death Qualification and its Interaction with Attitude Salience"
(2018). CMC Senior Theses. 1892.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1892

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Running Head: Death Qualification & Attitude Salience
	
  

Claremont McKenna College
The Changing Nature of Death Qualification
and its Interaction with Attitude Salience

submitted to
Professor Daniel Krauss
Dean of Faculty

by
Brendan Busch

for
Senior Thesis
Fall 2017 & Spring 2018
April 23rd, 2018

1	
  

	
  

	
  

Acknowledgements
I would first and foremost like to thank Professor Krauss for his guidance at every step of
this process, and for being an outstanding mentor throughout my entire college experience. I
greatly appreciate everything he has taught me over the past four years.

Additionally, I would like to thank the staff of the Santa Ana Superior Court for taking
the time out of their busy work schedules to help me recruit participants for this study. This
project would not have been possible without their generosity.

I would also like to thank my friends for helping me through this process. Thanks for
listening to me ramble about this project for a full year, I’m sure you all now know far more
about the death penalty than you ever wanted to.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their never-ending love and support. And for
reading a 50+ page thesis about death qualification and attitude salience.

	
  

Table of Contents
Title Page………………………………………………………………………………………….1
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………2
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..3
Methods…………………………………………………………………………………………..14
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………19
Discussion………………………………………………………………………………………..24
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….30
References………………………………………………………………………………………..32
Tables…………………………………………………………………………………………….36
Appendices……………………………………………………………………………………….39

Running Head: Death Qualification & Attitude Salience
	
  

The Changing Nature of Death Qualification
and its Interaction with Attitude Salience
Brendan Busch
Claremont McKenna College

1	
  

Death Qualification & Attitude Salience

2

Abstract
Death qualification is a problematic aspect of capital trials, as death qualified jurors have
higher conviction rates than non-death qualified jurors. The current study examines
whether the death qualification process itself affects juror decision-making via attitude
salience effects.
Participants (n=90) recruited from the venire juror pool at the Santa Ana Superior Court
were asked to read a trial transcript and decide guilt or innocence and whether they would
sentence the defendant to death. Half of the participants were given a survey determining
death qualification before they read the trial (making death qualification salient), while
the other half were given the survey at the end of the study (not salient condition).
Although the results do not support the theory that the death qualification process biases
jurors’ verdict and sentencing decisions, they do suggest that the proportion, attitudes,
and demographics of non-death qualified jurors have changed substantially since initial
research on death qualification was undertaken.
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The Changing Nature of Death Qualification and its Interaction with Attitude Salience
In the United States legal system, there exists a requirement that is unique to
capital cases. Jurors are constitutionally required to serve on cases in which the death
penalty is a potential sentence (Ring v. Arizona, 2002) and thus, must also undergo an
extra level of screening, called death qualification. The death qualification process has
been called into serious question by research which suggests the process produces a jury
sample that is biased towards conviction. Based upon that research, the present study
examines death qualification through the lens of attitude salience, and seeks to determine
if the death qualification process itself biases individual jurors. In other words, it seeks to
determine whether or not undergoing the death qualification process itself makes a juror
more or less likely to convict and offer a death sentence.
In order to answer that question, however, it is necessary to first understand death
qualification. Death qualification is the process by which capital juries are pre-screened
in order to remove people who are so opposed to the death penalty that they cannot
consider it as a sentence (Sullivan, 2014). The practice has a long history in the US legal
system. The first known usage of a death qualified jury was in a capital trial in
Pennsylvania in 1828, in which a prospective juror voluntarily informed the judge that he
would not be able to consider the death penalty as a sentence, and was thereby excused
from the jury (Cohen, 2008). Over time, the process has evolved and the precise meaning
of “death qualified” has been modified by a series of 20th century Supreme Court cases
(Swafford, 2011).
Historically, “death qualification” was a broad term. The first attempt to narrow
the definition occurred in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968). The controversy arose because

Death Qualification & Attitude Salience

4

the prosecutor had used death qualification to dismiss almost half of the potential jury
pool, essentially dismissing anyone who had any misgivings about the death penalty
(Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968). The Court eventually remanded for an additional
hearing, citing the unconstitutional use of death qualification. The Court held that the
prosecutor had used death qualification to create an abnormally pro-death penalty jury,
and set the precedent that a juror can only be dismissed via death qualification if he or
she “states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal” (Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968).
However, this narrow interpretation of death qualification was met with
opposition from the lower courts, who often simply ignored the ruling (Swafford, 2011).
The Supreme Court was not resolute in its defense of the Witherspoon standard either,
and actually loosened the restrictions on death qualification in Wainwright v. Witt (1985).
In 1985, an appeal rose to the Supreme Court in which the defense (whose client had
been convicted and sentenced to death) argued that the prosecution had unconstitutionally
dismissed a potential juror on the grounds of death qualification. The potential juror in
question had said that he opposed the death penalty to the point that it could interfere
with his decision-making process, but he did not state “unambiguously” that he would
automatically vote against the death penalty, and thus did not technically qualify for
dismissal under Witherspoon v. Illinois (Wainwright v. Witt, 1985). However, the
Supreme Court upheld the original conviction, thus modifying the requirement for death
qualification. The new Witt standard stated that a juror was not “death qualified” and
could be excused from jury service if their opinions on the death penalty “substantially
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impaired” their ability to make a sentencing decision involving the death penalty
(Wainwright v. Witt, 1985).
This broader interpretation of death qualification was again upheld by the
Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree (1986). The claimant in the case argued that the
death qualification process had violated his Sixth and Fourteenth rights by preventing
him from obtaining a fair trial, alleging that the death qualification process had created a
jury that was more conviction-prone than a typical jury (Lockhart v. McCree, 1986).
However, the Court upheld the exclusion of non-death qualified jurors, reinforcing the
legitimacy of the death qualification process and upholding the standard it had set in
Wainwright v. Witt. This standard would prove to be enduring, and still governs death
qualification (Swafford, 2011).
In practice, death qualification as defined in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) is a largely
subjective process. There is no standard set of questions that must be asked to
prospective jurors to determine their death qualification status. The judge has the broad
discretion to determine death qualification using whatever line of questioning he or she
wants, so long as they feel that jurors who are deemed unable to serve have demonstrated
that their opinions about the death penalty would have significantly affected their ability
to consider a death sentence (Sullivan, 2014). A judge can also dismiss as many potential
jurors due to death qualification as they deem necessary, and these dismissals do not
count as preemptory challenges, but rather as challenges for cause for the prosecution.
During the jury selection process, the prosecution and defense each get a set number of
peremptory challenges, which they can use to prevent specific potential jurors from being
placed onto the jury. This means that even if potential jurors do not present quite enough
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evidence to qualify for dismissal under death qualification or other forms of cause
challenges, but are still opposed to the death penalty, there is still a strong chance that the
prosecution will use a peremptory challenge to dismiss them (Sullivan, 2014).
The modern death qualification process is endlessly problematic, as research has
shown that it creates a jury that, when compared to a typical jury, is unconstitutionally
biased towards conviction. Seltzer, Lopes, Dayan, and Canan (1986) argued that the
death qualification process should be deemed unconstitutional on the grounds that it
created a biased pool of jurors who were statistically more likely to convict than the
general population. Their argument relied on 12 research studies which had all found
evidence that death qualified jurors were more conviction-prone than typical jurors. This
presents a major issue with death qualification; if the process produces a jury that is
biased towards conviction (in comparison to the general public), then is it still an
impartial jury?
Further research has also revealed demographic issues with death qualified juries.
Haney, Hurtado, and Vega (1994) examined 498 random Californians and surveyed them
concerning their opinions on the death penalty. They then used these surveys to
determine which participants would have been excluded under the Witt death
qualification standard. With respect to gender, they found that 64.1% of non-death
qualified participants (or excluded jurors) were women, even though the total sample was
only 48.4% female. Furthermore, ethnic minorities comprised 30.7% of the Wittexcludable group, but only 18.5% of the total sample (although the racial demographic
effects were somewhat undercut by low initial levels of ethnic minorities in the sample)
(Haney et al., 1994). This ethnic disparity has been repeatedly replicated; for example,
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one study found that racial minorities were more than twice as likely to be excluded by
the death penalty as white jurors (Summers et. al, 2010). This is problematic because
other research suggests that white jurors are more likely to convict black defendants than
white defendants (Foley & Chamblin, 1982). Thus, by excluding ethnic minorities at a
much higher rate than white jurors, the death qualification process creates a remaining
jury pool that is more likely to convict minority, and more specifically black, defendants.
Furthermore, Butler and Moran (2007a) demonstrated that death qualified jurors
are less able to effectively evaluate scientific evidence than the non-death qualified
jurors. Their study involved venire jurors reading and responding to mock trial
transcripts. They found that death qualified jurors were statistically more likely to deem
expert testimony with questionable methodology as scientifically valid than non-death
qualified jurors were. Additionally, they noted that death-qualified jurors on average
exhibited significantly lower levels of need-for-cognition, a scale that measures a
person’s need and desire to engage with high-effort cognitive activity, than non-death
qualified jurors. This suggests that death-qualified jurors are less able to properly
understand scientific evidence presented at trial, and are more likely to give weight to
scientifically invalid arguments. This is problematic, because a jury that does not
understand scientific testimony is liable to reach a verdict via faulty logic. If a jury
cannot understand the scientific facts of a case, then they must make their final decision
without all of the necessary information, which could cause them to come to an incorrect
verdict.
In a second study, Butler and Moran (2007b) determined that death qualified
jurors were more likely to believe in a just world and endorse legal authoritarian beliefs.
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The beliefs measured by these scales suggest that death qualified jurors are more likely to
blame the victim of an unjust event and value the legal rights of the government over the
legal rights of individuals. These are both characteristics that a defense attorney would
seek to avoid in prospective jurors, as they have been shown to be correlated with higher
conviction rates (Butler and Moran, 2007b).
In summary, there is considerable research suggesting that jurors that are deemed
“death qualified” under the Witt standard are demographically different than jurors who
are not death qualified, as they are prototypically male-leaning (Haney et al., 1994) and
white-leaning (Comes and Comber, 1984). They are also unable to correctly interpret
scientific evidence (Butler & Moran, 2007a). Even more importantly, death qualified
jurors are more conviction-prone (Seltzer et al., 1986), which raises questions about the
constitutionality of the death qualification process under the impartiality requirement of
the 6th amendment.
In addition to these substantive problems, past research has also shown that there
are procedural issues with death qualification. For example, by focusing jurors on the
sentencing phase before the trial actually begins, the death qualification process may
imply that there is a reasonable chance that the defendant in the eventual trial could be
guilty (Haney, 2005). Before the trial begins, during the death qualification process,
potential jurors are asked to imagine the penalty phase of the trial (the point at which they
would decide to give the death penalty) and predict their actions during this phase. In
this imagined scenario, potential jurors are required to forget the initial trial and imagine
a guilty verdict (Haney, 2005). This is worrisome, as past psychological research has
shown that the act of imagining a future scenario influences one’s estimation of that
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imagination scenario (Carroll, 1976). More specifically, imagining a future scenario
makes a subject believe that the imagined scenario is more likely to occur. For example,
a study found that participants who were asked to imagine Jimmy Carter winning the
presidential election thought that he was more likely to win than participants who were
not asked to imagine him winning (Carroll, 1976). Therefore, when this effect is applied
to death qualification, it is possible that asking participants to imagine a guilty verdict
causes them to think that the chances of a guilty verdict are more likely.
Additionally, the death qualification process appears to frame the trial through the
lens of the most extreme punishment (Haney 2005). Much in the way that making a juror
imagine their response to having to give the death penalty biases them towards
conviction, making jurors consider their views on the death sentence, but not on other
forms of punishment, causes them to consider the death penalty as the most salient
punishment for a guilty verdict. This practice is likely to involve the availability
heuristic, which is a cognitive error in which people base their judgements on information
that is most easily recalled (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Essentially, the death
qualification process forces jurors to think about their willingness to give the death
penalty, making that willingness easy to recall during the sentencing phase of a trial.
Thus, in accordance with availability heuristic, jurors would then factor their pro-death
penalty stance into their sentencing decision. Therefore, just by the nature of the types of
questions that are posed to potential jurors, death qualification may bias potential jurors
towards both conviction, and a capital sentence once the actual trial begins.
Moreover, the death qualification process itself may bias jurors prior to a trial by
desensitizing jurors to the death penalty. Exposing jurors to the death penalty before the
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trial forces them to confront the harsh realities of sentencing someone to death long
before they have to actually make the decision (Haney, 2005). Therefore, when jurors
are forced to envision the moral dilemma presented by the death penalty during a trial,
the gravity of the decision is diminished, as jurors have already had to consider their
stance on the death penalty during death qualification. This phenomenon is especially
powerful for jurors who have moral misgivings about the death penalty, as past research
has shown that repeatedly exposing participants to an unpleasant stimulus acclimates
them to it (Wolpe & Lazarus, 1964). Thus, death qualification creates problems for the
defense during a trial, because the are forced to contend with jurors who, to a certain
degree, are desensitized to the moral implications of the death penalty.
Furthermore, the death qualification process can impart the impression on jurors
that the court disapproves of people who oppose the death penalty (Haney, 2005).
Because the death qualification process is not done in private – potential jurors are
questioned about their death penalty opinions in front of the rest of the potential juror
pool – potential jurors are forced to watch the court dismiss people who oppose the death
penalty before they themselves are questioned about the death penalty. This could lead
them to believe that the “correct” course of action is to support the death penalty.
Because jurors are highly impressionable in the early stages of the trial process, jurors
could then carry this perception that the court expects them to be pro-death penalty
throughout the rest of the trial (Haney, 2005). Ultimately, beyond simply creating a pool
of jurors that are more conviction-prone than the general population, the death
qualification process could actively bias jurors against the defense by causing them to
imagine a guilty verdict before the trial actually begins, desensitizing jurors to the death
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penalty, and creating the impression that the court itself disapproves of jurors who are
opposed to the death penalty (Haney, 2005).
While all of these theories present ways in which the death qualification process
could bias jurors, one aspect of death qualification that has not been explored is the
possibility that the death qualification process makes jurors’ attitudes towards the death
penalty more salient before the trial. As a consequence, this saliency could influence
their eventual verdict and sentencing decision. “Attitude salience” is a term that has
existed in the psychological literature for decades, and refers to the phenomenon in which
a person who has explicitly stated their existing attitude towards a person, object, or
concept is more likely to take action in accordance with this attitude than a person who
has not explicitly stated their attitude towards that same subject (DeFleur & Westie,
1958). For example, one study found that participants who had their attitudes towards
abortion made salient with a pilot survey were more likely to commit to distributing a
petition at their college campus that matched their stance on abortion than participants
who did not have their attitudes towards abortion made salient (Petkova et al. 1995).
In the context of death qualification, this model would imply that people who
have been forced to declare their attitude towards the death penalty (i.e. during the death
qualification process) are more likely to base their eventual sentencing decision on this
previously held attitude than people who do not have to declare their attitudes. Thus,
because the death qualification process requires that the jury is only comprised of people
who have declared that they could consider the death penalty as a sentence, if the attitude
salience model is supported, these jurors would then be more likely to make their
sentencing decision based on this declaration.
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Several specific aspects of attitude salience could be applicable to the death
qualification process. For instance, research has shown that when an attribute of an
object is made salient in one context, this attribute becomes easier to recall in later
general assessments of the object. So, performing a survey or questionnaire that focuses
on one specific attribute of an object will most likely lead to an overweighting of that
attribute in a future general assessment of the object (Shavitt & Fazio, 1991). Therefore,
when death qualification calls specific attention to jurors’ attitudes towards the death
penalty (and requires them to approve of it), there is a risk that this approval will be
overweighted during the final sentencing decision.
Furthermore, empirical research has shown that “the more accessible the attitude,
the more predictive it [is] of subsequent behavior” (Fazio et al., 1989, p.284). This is
important in the context of death qualification because the death qualification process
makes jurors’ attitudes towards the death penalty more accessible than they would have
otherwise been during the trial. Being directly questioned about your personal beliefs on
the death penalty is likely to create greater accessibility for those attitudes than having
them develop subconsciously while objectively evaluating a capital case. Thus, when
applied to death qualification, attitude salience research suggests that the process, in
addition to eliminating those who are strongly opposed to the death penalty, may prime
the remaining jurors towards convicting and sentencing the defendant to death penalty
once the trial starts.
A useful framework for understanding this theory is the attitude accessibility
model. First proposed by Fazio, the attitude accessibility model explains the process by
which attitudes guide behavior (Fazio, 1986,1989,1990, Bargh et al. 1992). The model
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proposes that attitudes can only guide behavior if they are first retrieved from memory, in
a step called attitude activation (Fazio, 1986). Once activated, attitudes can influence
perceptions of both the attitude object and the situational context in which the object is
observed; these altered perceptions can subsequently influence behavior (Fazio, 1986).
Associative strength, the strength of the association between the object and the attitude,
ultimately determines if the attitude is activated (Fazio, 1989). Applying this model to
capital trials, a juror’s pre-existing beliefs about the death penalty would serve as the
attitude in question. Once activated, these attitudes could influence the juror’s
perceptions of the death penalty as the punishment in a capital trial, and eventually
influence their behavior by making them more likely to sentence a defendant to death.
Thus, because jurors would be more inclined to give the death penalty under these
influences, they would also be more likely to offer a guilty verdict, as this is a necessary
requirement to giving the death penalty. However, this can only happen if the attitude is
effectively activated. The death qualification process serves to strengthen the associative
strength between the trial and the juror’s attitudes towards the death penalty by directly
asking the juror to declare their position on the death penalty. In this way, death
qualification increases the likelihood that previously held beliefs about the death penalty
will influence a juror’s eventual verdict and sentencing decisions.
Present Research
The present study will build on the previous research highlighting the adverse
effects of the death qualification process by using the lens of attitude salience. The
current research will examine whether the death qualification process activates attitude
salience for the death penalty in a way that affects jurors’ conviction and sentencing
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rates. Using attitude salience and the attitude accessibility model as a framework, the
following hypothesizes will be tested:
1.   Death qualified participants will have higher conviction and death sentencing
rates than non-death qualified participants (Seltzer, et al., 1986).
2.   Death qualified participants who have undergone the death qualification
process (and thus have had their support of the death penalty made salient)
will have higher conviction and death sentencing rates than death qualified
participants who have not undergone the death qualification process (and thus
have not had their support of the death penalty made salient).
3.   Non-death qualified participants who have undergone the death qualification
process (and thus have had their opposition to the death penalty made salient)
will have lower conviction and death sentencing rates than non-death qualified
participants who have not undergone the death qualification process (and thus
have not had their opposition to the death penalty made salient).
4.   Demographically, the death qualified group will have a higher percentage of
male and white participants than the non-death qualified group (Haney et al.
1994, Swafford 2011)
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from the Santa Ana Superior Courthouse. They were
selected from the pool of potential jurors who had not been chosen to serve on a jury and
had been dismissed from jury duty at the end of their day-long waiting period.
Immediately before the notifying the venire jurors that their service had concluded, the
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court attendant read an announcement notifying them that they had the option to
participate in a jury decision-making study. They were also told that they would be paid
$10 for their participation.
The sample consisted of 105 participants. However, only 95 participants passed
the manipulation check, which had two parts. If participants did not correctly answer 7
out of 10 multiple choice questions about the trial they had just read, they were
dismissed. Additionally, if participants indicated that they would both always and never
give the death penalty during the death qualification survey, they were also dismissed.
The remaining sample was 48% male, and ages ranged from 19 to 75, with the mean age
being 38.5 (sd = 16.09). 56% of the sample was white, 13% was Hispanic, 20% was
Asian, 10% was Mixed, and 1% was Other (indicating their race was not listed on the
demographic survey). When indicating their political identity on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1
indicating “strongly conservative” and 7 indicating “strongly liberal”), 47% identified as
liberal (choosing options 5-7), 26% identified as centrist (choosing option 4), and 27%
identified as conservative (choosing options 1-3). Furthermore, 22% of the participants
had served on a jury before. As for the participants’ education levels, 4% had a doctorate
degree, 19% had a professional degree, 38% had a 4-year degree, 15% had a 2-year
degree, 20% had some college education, and 3% had a high school degree (Table 1).
Procedure
This study utilized a 2x2 between-subjects design. Participants were randomly
assigned to have their death-qualification status determined either before or after reading
a mock trial and deciding on their verdict and sentencing. Those who had their death
qualification status determined before acting as a mock juror were considered to have had

Death Qualification & Attitude Salience

16

their death penalty attitudes made salient, while those who determined their status after
acting as a mock juror were considered to have their death penalty attitudes not salient.
Then, based on their answers to the death-qualification survey, they were designated as
either death qualified or not death qualified. Those who were not death qualified were
decomposed into two groups – not death qualified because of opposition to the death
penalty (these participants were included in the final data analysis) and not death
qualified because of support for the death penalty (participants were placed in this group
if they claimed they would always give the death penalty as a sentence; because there
were only 5 participants who identified this way, they were excluded from the final data
analysis). The dependent variable for the study were the participants’ decision to find the
defendant guilty or not guilty, and (if a guilty verdict was reached) to either sentence the
defendant to death or life in prison.
After agreeing to participate in the study, participants who had been randomly
assigned to the death qualification salient group were given a 33-item survey that
measured their death qualification status and primed their attitudes concerning the death
penalty (See Appendix A). They were then instructed to read an excerpt from a mock
trial, which contained both a summary of the events of the trial and the transcript of
witness testimony (participants who were randomly assigned to the death qualification
not salient group were given the mock trial transcript immediately after agreeing to
participate, and were not administered the death qualification survey until later in the
study). The mock trial simulated the trial of a man who was accused of sexually
assaulting and then murdering his three daughters, and was loosely based on the
transcript of an actual Texas capital trial (Texas v. Willingham, 1992) (see Appendix B).
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After reading the mock trial, all participants were asked to complete a survey that
recorded their verdict and sentencing decisions (see Appendix C). Participants were then
given a 10-item survey to determine how well they remembered the facts of the (see
Appendix D) and a 7 item survey that measured their opinions on prosecuting attorneys,
defense attorneys, the police, and the insanity defense, to use as exploratory variables
(see Appendix E). At this point, the death qualification not salient group was given the
death qualification survey to complete. Finally, participants were administered
demographic questions (see Appendix F), and were debriefed.
Measures
Although presented as a continuous measure, the scale used to determine death
qualification was actually composed of two different components (See Appendix A).
Each component was drawn from a separate pre-existing scale, served a unique purpose,
and had its own scoring.
The first component was intended to make the participant’s death penalty
opinions salient and to simulate the length and depth of an actual death-qualification
interview (although, as previously discussed, there is no one standard interview
procedure). This component of the scale contains the 23-item ATDP Scale (Hingula &
Wrightman 2002), with the addition of 7 new items for increased length (i.e. items 24-30
were not included in the original scale, and were created for this study; the first 23 items
are presented as originally written). The scale measures participants’ opinions of the
death penalty by presenting them with a series of opinions about the death penalty (such
as “The government does not have the right to sentence people to death”), and asking
them to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale, ranging
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from strongly agree to strongly disagree. A high score on the scale indicates a high level
of support for the death penalty. The reliability for the scale was high (𝛼 = 0.937).
Twelve of the items were reverse coded.
The second component of the scale was used to determine the participants’ death
qualification status. This component of the scale (items 31-33) were formatted and
scored differently from the first 30 items, and were taken from an existing survey used to
determine death qualification (Garret, Krauss, & Scurich, 2017). The survey consists of
three yes-or-no questions that ask participants their attitudes about the death penalty, and
if they were so strong that they would be unable to consider all sentencing options. The
questions are as follows:
1.   “Do you have such conscientious objections to the death penalty that,
regardless of the evidence in a case, you would refuse to vote for murder in
the first degree merely to avoid reaching the death penalty issue?”
2.   “Even if you are able to conscientiously vote for guilt or innocence, do you
have such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, should we get to
the penalty phase of a trial, and regardless of the evidence in this case, you
would automatically vote for a verdict of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole and never vote for a verdict of death?”
3.   “Do you have such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that,
should we get to the penalty phase of a trial, and regardless of the evidence in
this case, you would automatically, and in every case, vote for a verdict of
death and never vote for a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole?”
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If participants answered No to all three questions, then they were categorized as
death qualified. However, if they answer Yes to any one of the questions, they were
categorized as not death qualified. A Yes answer to the first two questions (items 31 and
32) would indicate that a participant is not death qualified because they were either so
opposed to the death penalty that they would be unable to fairly consider a defendant’s
guilt or innocence or because they were so opposed to the death penalty that they would
be unable to consider it as a sentencing option, respectively. Finally, a Yes answer to the
third question (item 33) would indicate that a participant is not death qualified because
they are so in favor of the death penalty that they would not be able to consider life in
prison as a sentencing option (this group constituted a negligible percentage of the total
participants, and these participants were thus omitted from the data analysis).
The survey assessing participants’ memories of the facts of the trial (see
Appendix D) was composed of ten multiple choice questions (including items such as
“What was Mr. Anderson’s relationship to Mr. Johnson?”). Participants’ correct answers
were summed, and they were given a raw score out of 10. The survey assessing
participants’ opinions of various aspects of the legal process (see Appendix E) was
divided into four separate components, all composed of statements that participants
indicated their level of agreement with. The first item of the survey assessed
participants’ opinions of the trustworthiness of prosecutors. The second assessed their
opinions of the trustworthiness of defense attorneys, and the third assessed their opinions
of the trustworthiness of police. The final four items of the survey were compiled to
determine participants’ opinion of the insanity defense (𝛼 =.683).
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Results
Primary Analyses – Verdicts and Sentences
The primary analyses for this study consisted of two binary logistic regression
models – one to test participants’ conviction rates and one to test participants’ death
sentencing rates (Table 2). The first model examined the effect that participants’ death
qualification status (death qualified or not death qualified), death penalty attitude salience
(salient or not salient), and the interaction between the two variables had on their
likelihood to offer a guilty verdict. Only participants who passed the manipulation
checks (by scoring at least a 7 out of 10 on the trial recall test), and indicated that they
would not always choose to give the death penalty regardless of the specifics of the case
were included in the analysis (n=90). A binary logistic regression with verdict decision
(guilty or not guilty) as the outcome variable indicated that death qualification status
(χ2(1) = 20.584, p = .999), death penalty attitude salience (χ2(1) = 0.379, p = .556), and
the interaction between the two variables (χ2(1) = -21.457, p = .999) were not significant
(R2= 01.84).
A second binary logistic regression was run to analyze participants’ death
sentencing rates. In addition to the previous restrictions on the sample, this analysis only
included participants who offered a guilty verdict (n = 61). The regression, which used
the same independent variables but used participants’ death sentencing decisions (death
penalty or life in prison) as the outcome variable, indicated that death qualification status
(χ2(1) = 20.024, p = .999), death penalty attitude salience (χ2(1) = -0.405, p = .591), and
the interaction between the two variables (χ2(1) = -18.313, p = .999) were not significant
(R2 = .208).
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These results ultimately do not support the hypotheses of the study. First,
although a main effect of death qualification on verdict decision (such that participants
who were death qualified would be more likely to convict) was expected based on past
research, no main effect was found. Similarly, a main effect of death qualification on
death sentencing rates (such that death qualified participants would be more likely to give
the death sentence) was expected yet, again, no such main effect was found.
Furthermore, the third hypothesis predicted that there would be an interaction effect
between death qualification and death penalty salience that would predict participants’
verdict and sentencing decisions, but the hypothesis was not supported; the interaction
between these variables did not significantly predict verdict or sentencing decisions.
Secondary Analyses – Confidence and External Validity
In addition to participants’ binary decisions on verdict and sentencing,
participants’ confidence in their verdict and sentencing decisions were measured to
determine if their confidence level could be predicted by death qualification and death
penalty attitude salience (Table 3). First, a 2x2 factorial ANOVA was run with verdict
confidence (measured on a 1-5 scale) as the dependent variable and death qualification
status and death penalty attitude salience as independent variables. The analysis showed
death qualification [F(1,86) = 0.004, p = .952], death penalty attitude salience [F(1, 86) =
2.145, p =.147], and the interaction between death qualification and attitude salience
[F(1, 86) = 1.841, p = .178], were all insignificant. This analysis supports the initial
finding that death qualification status and death penalty attitude salience do not affect
jurors’ decision-making process when it comes to offering a verdict. Taken together, the
primary and secondary analyses show that death qualification and attitude salience do not
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significantly predict a juror’s verdict or their confidence in that verdict, suggesting that
the death qualification process as a whole does not play an important role in determining
a juror’s verdict, which contradicts previous research reporting a link between death
qualification and guilty verdicts (Seltzer et al. 1986).
For participants who offered a guilty verdict and properly provided a sentencing
confidence score (n = 56), a similar 2x2 factorial ANOVA was run to examine their
confidence in their sentencing decisions, using sentencing confidence (again measured on
a 1-5 scale) as the dependent variable and death qualification status and death penalty
attitude salience as independent variables. The analysis found death qualification [F(1,
52) = 0.018, p =.893], death penalty attitude salience [F(1, 52) = 3.154, p =.082], and the
interaction between death qualification and attitude salience [F(1, 52) = 1.311, p =.258],
were insignificant. Like the previous analysis, these results support the primary
analysis’s finding that death qualification and death penalty attitude salience do not
significantly affect jurors’ death sentence decision making process.
In order to ensure that the death qualification measure was valid, it was compared
to a longer survey that asked participants detailed questions about their attitudes towards
the death penalty. This death penalty attitude survey consisted of 28 questions (2
questions were omitted from the original scale due to irrelevance to the desired
measurement), and the scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.937, indicating that it had high
internal consistency. A binary logistic regression with death qualification as the outcome
variable indicated that participants’ scores on the extended death penalty attitudes survey
significantly predicted their death qualification status (χ2(1) = -2.976, p < .001). The R2
value of 0.57 suggests that 57% of the variance in participants’ death qualification status
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can be determined by their score on the longer death penalty attitude assessment scale,
indicating that, while not perfect, the death qualification variable used in this study is
reasonably externally valid.
Exploratory Analyses – Death Qualification
Further exploratory analyses were conducted to examine whether variables
measured in this study could predict participants’ death qualification status. First,
demographic information was analyzed in a binary logistic with death qualification status
as the dependent variable. The regression showed that gender, age, education level, race,
and former jury service were all not significantly related to death qualification (all pvalues over 0.529). Political identification was also not significantly related to death
qualification, but it approached significance political identification (χ2(1) = 0.282, p =
.094). The overall R2 of the model was 0.235. These findings directly contradict the
study’s final hypothesis, which predicted that male and white participants would be more
likely to be death qualified. Unlike the findings in previous research, the results of this
study suggest that the effects that race and gender have on death qualification status are
insignificant (Haney et al. 1994, Swafford 2011).
Finally, a series of attitude statements about the criminal justice system were
analyzed to determine if any of the participants’ previously held beliefs about the legal
system could predict their death qualification status. One of the independent variables in
the model, opinions about the insanity defense, was composed of an averaged score of
three questions, which had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .683 (which does not quite reach the
typical benchmark of 0.7, but closely approaches it). The regression, which used death
qualification status as the dependent variable, found that a participant’s opinion of the
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police significantly predicted their death qualification status (χ2(1) = -0.626, p = .046),
but a participant’s opinion of prosecution attorneys (χ2(1) = -0.231, p = .598), defense
attorneys (χ2(1) = 0.514, p = .257), the insanity defense (χ2(1) = -0.388, p = .243), and
their belief that if a defendant is unwillingness to testify it is most likely because they are
guilty (χ2(1) = -0.042, p = .886), did not significantly predict death qualification status
(R2 =.139). The relationship between a participant’s opinion of the police and their death
qualification status was such that participants who had a more favorable opinion of the
police were more likely to be death qualified.
Discussion
Ultimately, the results of the study did not support any of the original hypotheses.
The theory that making a juror’s attitudes towards the death penalty salient would
exaggerate the pre-existing difference between the conviction (and sentencing) rates of
death qualified and non-death qualified jurors was not borne out by the data. There were
no significant interaction effects between death qualification and attitude salience
manipulations that predicted verdict or sentencing decisions. However, surprisingly, it is
also because there were no main effects of death qualification on verdict or sentencing
decisions; that is, there was no “pre-existing” difference in conviction rates between
death qualified and non-death qualified jurors to begin with, despite what previous
research would suggest (Seltzer et al. 1986). This is a very perplexing finding, as it
suggests that the attitudes of the “death qualified” population may be changing.
However, the results of the analyses do still have some potentially important implications
for forensic psychology research. Because there was no interaction effect between death
qualification and attitude salience, it appears that undergoing the process of death
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qualification does not have any affect on jurors’ verdicts. Thus, the inclusion of death
qualification scales in future or past forensic research should not bias conviction or
sentencing rates, and should not act as a confounding variable.
The more surprising finding of this study was the lack of main effects for death
qualification on conviction or sentencing rates; essentially, the results suggest that a
participant’s death qualification status does not significantly determine their verdict or
sentencing decision. The lack of a main effect of death qualification on sentencing
decisions can most likely be attributed to a lack of power in that analysis, due to both a
low number of death qualified participants that sentenced (n = 25) and a relatively low
death sentencing rate of 28% (Table 2) for death qualified participants who offered a
guilty verdict (a somewhat surprising finding given the gruesome nature of the crime
presented in the mock trial). Furthermore, of the non-death qualified participants, all but
one chose to sentence the defendant to life in prison rather than choosing the death
penalty, giving the non-death qualified group a death sentencing rate of just 4% (Table
2). Thus, although the power of this particular analysis was not strong enough to detect
an effect, the results trended in the predicted direction.
However, the lack of a main effect for death qualification on verdicts is harder to
explain. In fact, although not statistically significant, the results of this analysis actually
trend in the opposite direction than what was predicted by past research. Death qualified
participants had a conviction rate of 61%, while non-death qualified participants had a
surprisingly high conviction rate of 78% (Table 2). While, again, these results are not
statistically significant, they are quite different from the expected results, as one would
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think that qualified jurors should have a significantly higher conviction rate than nondeath qualified jurors.
This finding could suggest that the demographics and attitudes of the death
qualified population are changing from what was originally observed in the 1980s. For
one thing, the sheer number of participants that were non-death qualified in this
experiment was inconsistent with historical studies. For example, in his 1994 study,
Haney reported that 19% of his participants (who were also drawn from a randomized
sample in California) were not death qualified. Furthermore, research on death
qualification in the 1980s estimated that 11-17% of the population was not death
qualified, and this was the estimate that the Supreme Court used when it upheld the
current interpretation of death qualification in Lockhart v. McCree (1986). However, this
study found that 39% of venire jurors were not death qualified (including those who were
unqualified because they claimed they would always give the death penalty). This
statistic is similar to a finding by Garrett, Krauss, and Scurich (2017), who reported that
32% of venire jurors were not death qualified (similarly to the current study, their sample
also included venire jurors from the Santa Ana Superior Court). Taken together, these
two recent studies suggest that, in the decades since Lockhart v. McCree was decided,
there has been a substantial increase in the percentage of Americans who are not deathqualified. This raises serious constitutional issues for death qualification; when the Court
last set the death qualification standard, it was operating under the assumption that less
than 20% of the population would be excluded by it. However, if the death qualification
standard currently excludes over a third of Americans from serving on capital juries, is
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the current non-death qualified group still equivalent to the group the Court intended to
exclude in Lockhart v. McCree?
Much of the research that found that death qualified jurors were more likely to
convict than non-death qualified jurors was completed in the 1980s, when death
qualification rates were still reported to be as high as 88% of the population (Seltzer et.
al, 1986). However, now that death qualification rates appear to have fallen to just 61%
of the population, one possible explanation for the disappearance of the connection
between death qualification and conviction rates could be that the non-death qualified
population has become less radical and more similar to the death qualified population.
According to a Gallup poll, the percent of the population that was opposed to the death
penalty in 1985 was 17%, with this number falling to as low as 13% in 1995. However,
the percentage of Americans who are opposed to the death penalty rose substantially
during the 21st century, and as of October 2017, 41% of Americans are currently opposed
to the death penalty (Gallup 2017). When death qualification was being studied in the
1980’s, and only 17% of the population opposed the death penalty, being opposed to the
death penalty was a much more radical stance than it is today. Thus, the non-death
qualified population of the 1980s likely consisted primarily of extreme liberals, who
would have been less inclined to convict than the general population. However, now that
opposition to the death penalty is much more frequent, it would not be surprising if the
non-death qualified population has become more representative of the general population.
Consequently, the current non-death qualified group may be much more similar to the
death qualified population than it was 30 years ago. As the non-death qualified
population grows and becomes more equivalent to the death-qualified population, it is
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logical that previously observed effects that death qualification had on conviction rates
would start to disappear.
The death qualification groups’ demographic information further supports the
notion that the composition of the death qualified population has changed considerably.
This demographic shift is most observable in the gender differences between death
qualified and non-death qualified groups. In 1994, Haney found that 64% of non-death
qualified individuals were women. However, the current study found that only 44% of
non-death-qualified participants were women, while 60% of death qualified participants
were women. In fact, 71% of women in the current study were death qualified while only
51% of men were death qualified (Table 1). While women used to be significantly more
likely than men to be non-death qualified (Haney et al. 1994), the current study suggests
that this is no longer the case, as gender did not significantly predict death qualification.
This finding suggests that the influx of new non-death qualified jurors could be men, as
(although the percent of non-death qualified jurors has increased overall) female
representation in the non-death qualified population has declined. Similarly, this study
found that race and political identification no longer predict death qualification.
However, the results for these demographics are less convincing than those for gender, as
the racial analysis was hindered by the fact that none of the participants identified as
black and only 13% identified as Hispanic (with the rest identifying as either white,
Asian, or mixed). Furthermore, political identification approached significance as a
predictor of death qualification, and it is possible that an effect could be observed in a
higher-powered study such that liberals would be significantly less likely to be death
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qualified than conservatives, as 65% of conservatives were death qualified in this study,
but only 56% of liberals were death qualified (Table 1).
Ultimately, the only factor that significantly predicted death qualification was
trust in law enforcement, such that participants who had a higher level of trust for police
were more likely to be death qualified. This result demonstrates that, while they may be
becoming more similar, the death qualified and non-death qualified populations are not
yet identical. However, the fact that gender, race, political identity, and education level
do not significantly predict death qualification, and that death qualification did not
significantly predict conviction rates, suggests that both the demographics and attitudes
of the death qualified and non-death qualified populations have changed substantially
since much of the foundational research was completed
Limitations.
This study is limited by a number of factors. First, the study was constrained to a
population of venire jurors exclusively drawn from Orange County, California. Because
this sample contained no black participants and only 12 Hispanic participants, it is
difficult to generalize the racial findings from this study to a national sample. However,
because participants were gathered from the venire jury pools at the Santa Ana Superior
Court, the sample was more representative than a typical college student or online
sample, and was likely more representative of jury-eligible adults in Orange County.
Additionally, the study was limited in that the mock trial presented to participants was
much shorter than a typical trial, contained no legal instructions from a judge, contained
limited testimony, and was presented in written form rather than as a video, potentially
reducing the external validity of the participants’ mock trial experience. However, such
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factors appear to play a very limited role in simulated jury differences (Bornstein, 2017).
Furthermore, the participants lacked consequentialism in their decisions, as they knew
that they were participating in a mock trial, and that their decisions would not have any
effect on the defendant in the trial. However, research suggests that there tend to be few
differences between jurors making decisions with real consequences and jurors making
hypothetical decisions (Bornstein, 2017). Finally, the amount of time participants waited
between undergoing the death qualification process and providing an actual sentence was
much shorter than it would be in an actual trial Although if anything, this limitation
would likely bias the results in favor of the hypothesized results, and as such likely did
not have a large effect on the conclusions of the study.
Conclusion
Although the study did not find that the death qualification process biases jurors
in their verdict or sentencing decision-making, it did produce several important findings.
The study found that the percentage of the population that is not death qualified has
grown considerably since the foundational research on death qualification was
completed. Further, in contrast to past research, this larger non-death qualified
population does not significantly differ from death qualified jurors in its conviction rates.
Additionally, this study demonstrates that the demographics of the death-qualified
population are changing, especially in regards to gender (with women making up an
increasing proportion of the death qualified population and men making up an increasing
proportion of the non-death qualified population). Future research is needed to verify
whether this increase in non-death qualified jurors is a national trend or is simply
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political breakdowns of this increasing population of non-death qualified jurors.
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Tables
Table 1
Demographic information
Death Qualified

Non-Death Qualified

Always Death

Gender
Male

51% (n = 23)

38% (n = 17)

11% (n = 5)

Female

71% (n = 34)

29% (n = 14)

0% (n = 0)

0% (n = 0)

100% (n = 1)

0% (n = 0)

White

70% (n = 37)

26% (n = 14)

4% (n = 2)

Asian

53% (n = 10)

42% (n = 8)

5% (n = 1)

Hispanic

42% (n = 5)

42% (n = 5)

16% (n = 2)

Mixed

60% (n = 6)

40% (n = 4)

0% (n = 0)

Other

0% (n = 0)

100% (n = 1)

0% (n = 0)

0% (n = 0)

67% (n = 2)

33% (n = 1)

Some College

58% (n = 11)

32% (n = 6)

10% (n = 2)

2-Year Degree

57% (n = 8)

43% (n = 6)

0% (n = 0)

4-Year Degree

64% (n = 23)

36% (n = 13)

0% (n = 0)

Professional Degree

67% (n = 12)

22% (n = 4)

11% (n = 2)

Doctorate

75% (n = 3)

25% (n = 1)

0% (n = 0)

56% (n = 25)

44% (n = 20)

0% (n = 0)

Other
Race

Education Level
High School

Political Identification
Liberal
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Conservative

69% (n = 18)

23% (n = 6)

8% (n = 2)

Centrist

61% (n = 14)

27% (n = 6)

12% (n = 3)

Notes: Percentages refer to the percent of participants in each demographic condition
that have the given death qualification status (with the “n” variable referring to the
number of participants in each condition that have the given death qualification status).
For example 51% (n = 23) under the “Male” and “Death Qualified” categories means
that 23 men, or 51% of all of the men in the sample, are death qualified.

Table 2
Conviction and Death Sentencing Rates by Condition	
  
Death Qualified

Non-Death Qualified

Conviction Rates
Salient Condition

53% (n = 32)

100% (n = 12)

Not Salient Condition

70% (n = 27)

65% (n = 20)

Both Conditions

61% (n = 59)

78% (n = 32)

Salient Condition

24% (n = 17)

0% (n = 12)

Not Salient Condition

32% (n = 19)

8% (n = 13)

Both Conditions

28% (n = 38)

4% (n = 25)

Death Sentencing Rates

Notes: The “n” variable refers to the total number of participants in the condition, while
the percentage refers to the percent of participants in that condition that either convicted
or gave the death penalty.
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Table 3
Average Confidence Score by Condition
Death Qualified

Death Qualified

Non-Death

Non-Death

& Salient

& Not Salient

Qualified &

Qualified &

Salient

Not Salient

Verdict
Guilty

3.71 (1.05)

3.79 (0.71)

3.33 (1.23)

4.07 (0.64)

Not Guilty

3.47 (0.52)

3.14 (0.90)

N/A

3.57 (1.13)

Death

4.50 (0.58)

4.33 (0.52)

N/A

N/A

Life in Prison

3.77 (1.09)

4.00 (0.77)

3.58 (1.44)

4.40 (0.84)

Sentence

Notes: Values refer to the mean score of participants in each condition on a 5-point
confidence scale (with the standard deviation in parentheses). There are three “N/A”
values because all participants in the Non-Death Qualified & Salient condition offered
guilty verdicts and a sentence of life in prison, and the one Non-Death Qualified & Not
Salient participant who offered a death sentence failed to fill out a confidence score for
their sentencing decision.
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Appendix A
This questionnaire contains a set of attitude statements. There are no right or wrong
answers: we are interested in your opinions. Please read each statement carefully and
then circle the response that reflects your reaction.
SA = strongly agree, A = agree, U = undecided,
D = disagree, SD = strongly disagree
1.   A judge should have the right to sentence a defendant to death, even if the jury
has recommended life in prison.
SA
A
U
D
SD
2.   People on death row are permitted to appeal their sentence too often.
SA
A
U
D
SD
3.   If there is any doubt about a defendant’s guilt, he or she should not be executed.
SA
A
U
D
SD
4.   If a defendant on death row wants a DNA test of evidence, the state should
automatically grant it.
SA
A
U
D
SD
5.   People remain on death row too long.
SA
A
U

D

6.   It is wrong to sentence the mentally retarded to death.
SA
A
U
D

SD
SD

7.   Children over 14 years should be able to receive a death sentence if they commit
murder
SA
A
U
D
SD
8.   Those sentenced to life imprisonment often get out on parole.
SA
A
U
D
SD
9.   Those who spend life in prison have too many luxuries (for example, TV, exercise
equipment, etc.).
SA
A
U
D
SD
10.  Severe actions deserve equally severe punishments.
SA
A
U
D

SD

11.  The government does not have the right to sentence people to death.
SA
A
U
D
SD
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12.  Men and women should be treated equally when the death sentence is considered.
SA
A
U
D
SD
13.  I am opposed to the execution of women who are pregnant.
SA
A
U
D
SD
14.  It is worse to get a sentence of life in prison without parole than to get the death
penalty.
SA
A
U
D
SD
15.  No civilized society permits capital punishment.
SA
A
U
D

SD

16.  It is necessary to permit the death penalty in order to reduce the murder rate.
SA
A
U
D
SD
17.  The possibility of being executed serves as a deterrent against committing violent
crimes.
SA
A
U
D
SD
18.  Laws that permit the death penalty devalue the worth of every human life.
SA
A
U
D
SD
19.  The death penalty is acceptable as a last resort.
SA
A
U
D

SD

20.  A vote for the death penalty in some cases may be due to discrimination against a
defendant who is a minority
SA
A
U
D
SD
21.  Laws permitting the death penalty use violence to punish violence.
SA
A
U
D
SD
22.  The only way to control some potential crime is to enforce the death penalty.
SA
A
U
D
SD
23.  If a woman committed a crime along with a man, and he is sentenced to death, she
should be too.
SA
A
U
D
SD
24.  The death penalty should not be used because there is no way to reverse the
punishment if the defendant is later found to be innocent.
SA
A
U
D
SD
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25.  There are some crimes that are so heinous that it would be immoral to let the
perpetrator live.
SA
A
U
D
SD
26.  I would feel personally responsible for killing another human being if I were to
give the death penalty.
SA
A
U
D
SD
27.  The death penalty is the only way to deter criminals who have already served
several sentences in jail.
SA
A
U
D
SD
28.  The death penalty is not worth its high monetary cost to the government.
SA
A
U
D
SD
29.  After being given the death penalty, people should be executed as quickly as
possible.
SA
A
U
D
SD
30.  The death penalty allows the victim’s family to get justice.
SA
A
U
D
SD
For the next three questions, please indicate your answer by checking either
the Yes or No option.
31.  Do you have such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of
the evidence in a case, you would refuse to vote for murder in the first degree
merely to avoid reaching the death penalty issue?
_________Yes or _________No
32.  Even if you are able to conscientiously vote for guilt or innocence, do you have
such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, should we get to the
penalty phase of a trial, and regardless of the evidence in this case, you would
automatically vote for a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole and never vote for a verdict of death?
_________Yes or _________No
33.  Do you have such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that, should
we get to the penalty phase of a trial, and regardless of the evidence in this case,
you would automatically, and in every case, vote for a verdict of death and never
vote for a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?
_________Yes or _________No
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Appendix B
The following information is part of a mock trial. Please know that your
decisions will NOT have any effects on any real people and that your answers will be
used only for research. However, we ask that you please take this case seriously and treat
it as if it were a real trial, considering all of the evidence that is presented.

Case Summary
On Sunday April 3rd, 2017, the home of Brian Johnson caught fire and burned to
the ground. All three of Mr. Johnson’s daughters – aged 4, 6, and 9 – perished in the fire,
while Mr. Johnson emerged with only minor burns. Mrs. Johnson was out shopping at
the time and was unaware of what happened until the fire department was already on the
scene, at which point she received a call from her husband.
The defendant, Mr. Brian Johnson, is currently on trial for three counts of firstdegree murder. The prosecution alleges that Mr. Johnson intentionally set the fire to
murder his three daughters, so that he could cover up the fact that he had been sexually
assaulting them for years. However, the defense has called this accusation “wildly
speculative,” and although it is true that the prosecution does not have enough evidence
to charge Mr. Johnson with sexual assault, they maintain that it was a highly relevant
aspect of Mr. Johnson’s motive, and have a witness who claims that Mr. Johnson
admitted to (and even bragged about) sexually assaulting his daughters. Mrs. Johnson
refutes this accusation against her husband.
Early in the trial, Mr. Johnson’s neighbors recounted that, on the day of the fire,
Mr. Johnson exited the house very quickly after the flames were first visible (Mr.
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Johnson claims that he was in the house’s front-most room when the fire started and that
the flames prevented him from reaching any other room in the house). Mr. Johnson
immediately begged his neighbors to call 911, but after that began to behave “very
strangely.” According to neighbors who were present at the scene of the fire, Mr.
Johnson oscillated between very outward bursts of emotion (especially once the
authorities arrived) and long periods of calmness (as he moved his car and other
possessions out of the path of the flames).

Currently, the prosecution has called a police investigator to the stand who has
asserted that the evidence strongly suggests that the fire was intentionally started. An
abbreviated transcript of his testimony appears below:

Prosecution: When did you first arrive at the scene?
Investigator: I arrived an hour after the fire was put out, so about three hours after it
started.
Prosecution: After examining the scene, what did you think started the fire?
Investigator: After spending about two hours at the scene, I came to the conclusion that
the fire was started intentionally with the aid of a liquid accelerant.
Prosecution: What was the evidence that led you to this conclusion?
Investigator: On the floor of the house, there were char marks in the shape of puddles,
which highly suggests that a liquid accelerant was used to start the fire. Additionally,
based on the path of destruction, the fire appeared to have two distinct starting points,
which would be very unusual for a fire that was not intentionally set. Finally, the damage
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and the time in which it took the fire to burn through most of the house show that the fire
burned fast and hot, another indicator that the fire was started by a liquid accelerant.
Prosecution: No further questions.
The police investigator is cross examined by the defense:

Defense: Is your work on this case an exact science, or is there room for interpretation?
Detective: It is my job to consider all of the evidence available and make my best
possible analysis of the situation.
Defense: So, can you say with 100% certainty that this fire was intentionally set.
Detective: No, I cannot say that with 100% certainty, but I would say that it is the most
likely cause.
Defense: But it wouldn’t be impossible for there to have been a different cause?
Detective: No, it is possible that there was another cause.
Defense: What else could have caused the fire?
Detective: It is possible that the fire could have been an electrical fire, but again it is
unlikely that an electrical fire would burn in the way that this fire did; it is most likely
that this fire was intentionally set using a liquid accelerant.
Defense: No further questions.

Next, the prosecution calls Mr. Johnson’s cellmate at the Orange County Maximum
Security Prison to the stand. An abbreviated transcript of his testimony appears below:

Prosecution: Please state your name and relationship to the defendant.
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Mr. Anderson: My name is Steve Anderson, I’ve been Mr. Johnson’s cellmate for the
past month.
Prosecution: Has Mr. Johnson ever discussed the fire with you before?
Mr. Anderson: Yeah, a couple of times. He told me that he set the fire himself, and that
he had been thinking of doing it for months.
Prosecution: Did he say why he set the fire?
Mr. Anderson: Yeah. He said that he had been – you know – sleeping with his
daughters for a few years. I guess he was worried that he was going to get caught, cuz he
said he had to “get rid of them” before anyone found out what he had done.
Prosecution: So Mr. Johnson told you explicitly that he has been raping his daughters for
an extended period of time and that he set the fire with the intention of murdering them?
Mr. Anderson: Yeah.
Prosecution: Did he say why he decided to do this now?
Mr. Anderson: He said he was worried that his daughters were getting old enough to tell
other people what the had done.
Prosecution: No further questions.

The defense cross examines Mr. Anderson:
Defense: Mr. Anderson, did you have any previous relationship with Mr. Johnson before
you became his cellmate?
Mr. Anderson: No, I didn’t know him before then.
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Defense: So, if Mr. Johnson killed his daughters because he was worried about people
finding out that he was assaulting them, as you claim, then why would he tell you this
information? And a few weeks before his trial at that?
Mr. Anderson: I don’t know, he said that he knew I would understand; I’m in for sex
crimes too.
Defense: Isn’t it true that you have a probation hearing coming up in two weeks?
Mr. Anderson: Yes that’s true.
Defense: Interesting. Are you sure that the prosecution didn’t offer to let you off on an
early probation if you made up this false testimony against Mr. Johnson?
Mr. Anderson: What? No, absolutely not.
Defense: No further questions.
[End of transcript]
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Appendix C
Please answer the following questions by circling the letter or number that best represents
your opinion.
1.   What is your verdict?
A) Guilty
B) Not Guilty
2.   How confident are you in your decision?
1

2

3

4

Not	
  at	
  all	
  confident	
  

5
Very	
  confident	
  

3.   If you found the defendant guilty, how do you sentence the defendant?
A) Death
B) Life in Prison
C) Not applicable, I found the defendant not guilty
4.   How confident are you in your decision? If you found the defendant not guilty,
please leave this answer blank.
1
Not	
  at	
  all	
  confident	
  

2

3

4

5
Very	
  confident	
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Appendix D
Please answer the following questions about the trial by circling the correct answer.
1.   What is Mr. Johnson on trial for?
A) Breaking and entering
B) Three counts of murder
C) Sexual assault
D) Tax evasion
2.   Who died in the fire?
A) Mr. Johnson
B) Mr. Johnson’s wife
C) Mr. Johnson’s daughters
D) No one
3.   Why did Mr. Johnson say that he couldn’t rescue anyone from the fire?
A) He was in the front room of the house when the fire started, and the flames
prevented him from going anywhere else in the house.
B) He was not in the house at the time of the fire.
C) He did not know that anyone else was home at the time of the fire.
D) He was unconscious when the firemen found him in the house.
4.   Why does the prosecution claim that Mr. Johnson started the fire?
A) He was trying to cover up the fact that he was sexually assaulting his
daughters
B) He was trying to collect insurance on the house
C) He was a serial arsonist
D) He was in the middle of a bitter feud with his wife
5.   How does Mrs. Johnson feel about the accusations against her husband?
A) She refutes them
B) She endorses them
C) She is indifferent
D) Mrs. Johnson is dead
6.   According to neighbors who were present at the scene of the fire, how was Mr.
Johnson’s behavior?
A) He appeared to be in a state of total shock
B) He was hysterically emotional
C) He was eerily calm
D) He went back and forth between outbursts of emotion and a state of calm
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7.   What does the police detective believe was the cause of the fire?
A) An electrical problem
B) A gas leak
C) Liquid accelerant, used to intentionally start the fire
D) An improvised flamethrower
8.   Was the detective 100% certain of his determination of the cause of the fire?
A) Yes
B) No
C) He refused to say
D) He admitted he had no idea what caused the fire
9.   What was Mr. Anderson’s relationship to Mr. Johnson?
A) Childhood friend
B) Cousin
C) Therapist
D) Cellmate
10.  Why does the defense think Mr. Anderson fabricated his testimony?
A) He has a personal vendetta against Mr. Johnson
B) Mr. Anderson is the person who actually started the fire
C) He is trying to make a deal with the prosecution to get an early probation
D) He is having an affair with Mr. Johnson’s wife
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Appendix E
This questionnaire contains a set of attitude statements. There are no right or wrong
answers: we are interested in your opinions. Please read each statement carefully and
then circle the response that reflects your reaction.
SA = strongly agree, A = agree, U = undecided,
D = disagree, SD = strongly disagree
1.   I believe that prosecuting attorneys are trustworthy.
SA
A
U
D

SD

2.   I believe that defense attorneys are trustworthy.
SA
A
U
D

SD

3.   I believe that the police are trustworthy.
SA
A
U

SD

D

4.   If a defendant chooses not to testify in their own trial, it is probably because they
are guilty.
SA
A
U
D
SD
5.   The insanity defense returns dangerous criminals to the streets.
SA
A
U
D
SD
6.   Defense attorneys abuse the insanity defense and use it to circumvent the criminal
justice system.
SA
A
U
D
SD
7.   The insanity defense is necessary to keep the mentally ill out of prison and get
them the help they need.
SA
A
U
D
SD
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Appendix F
Please answer the following questions by circling the letter or number of the choice that
best represents you.
1. What is your gender?
A) Male
B) Female
C) Other
2. What is your age?
_________
3. What is your highest level of education?
A) Less than high school
B) High school graduate
C) Some college
D) 2 year degree
E) 4 year degree
F) Professional degree
G) Doctorate
4. What race/ethnicity do you identify as?
A) African American
B) Asian
C) Hispanic (non-white)
D) Hispanic (white)
E) Native American
F) Pacific Islander
G) White
H) Other
I) Mixed
5. Ideologically, which of the following best describes you?
Strongly Moderately
Liberal
Liberal
1

2

Weakly
Liberal
3

6. Have you ever served on a jury?
A) Yes
B) No

Centrist/
Weakly
Strongly
Moderately
Middle of the Conservative Conservative Conservative
Road
4

5

6

7

